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The effect of a one-level reduction can be substantial. For
the most serious offenses, the reduction can shift the
Guidelines range by years, and even make the difference
between a fixed-term and a life sentence. The present
disagreement among the Courts of Appeals means that
similarly situated defendants may receive substantially
different sentences depending on the jurisdiction in which
they are sentenced.1
I. INTRODUCTION
People who dream of a career in criminal litigation often grew up
watching procedural dramas on television. For me, that memorable
procedural drama was Law and Order: Special Victims Unit (“SVU”). In
SVU, many of the episodes would reach their conclusion in a similar fashion:
the tension would mount in the courtroom as the district attorney and the
defense counsel would examine the witnesses, fending off the objections of
opposing counsel. Near the end of the episode, the case would be resolved
and, more often than not, the criminals would be sent to Rikers Island, leaving
Olivia Benson and her squad to celebrate their work in the never-ending fight
for justice in New York City. Though I perceived the criminal justice system
to operate in this fanciful way before I attended law school, that façade
quickly faded once I became a law student and saw how cases truly transpire
in the realm of criminal justice.
In today’s federal criminal system, many cases are adjudicated by
way of a plea bargain rather than a guilty verdict at trial.2 This process, which
involves calculating an advisory sentence under the United States Sentencing
Guidelines, takes place between the United States Attorney’s Office and

1

Longoria v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 978, 979 (2021) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, FEDERAL SENTENCING: THE BASICS 5 (2018) (stating that “97% of
federal defendants convicted of a felony or Class A misdemeanor offense” were adjudicated based upon a
plea of guilty rather than a trial.).
2
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defense counsel.3 With such a high volume of cases reaching their conclusion
through the plea-bargaining system, it is imperative that the statutory
language surrounding these agreements, as well as the sentences that are
produced by them, is clear and unequivocal for practitioners and defendants
alike.
Unfortunately, a rift in the circuit court opinions, resulting in
differing sentences for criminal defendants, highlights the disparity in the
plea-bargaining system under the United States Sentencing Guidelines.
In United States v. Longoria, a defendant was denied a one-level reduction
under their advisory Sentencing Guidelines range because the prosecutor
refused to make the motion for a one-level reduction in the applicable base
offense level, citing their preparation for a suppression hearing prior to trial.4
Currently, the Second and Fifth Circuits hold that preparation for
a suppression hearing can be grounds for the United States Attorney’s Office
or the court to withhold the one-level reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b).5
At the same time, the Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits hold that preparation
for pre-trial motions, like motions to suppress, cannot be the sole ground for
withholding the one-level reduction.6
This Comment seeks to navigate and rectify the current schism in the
process for plea-bargaining in the federal system by proposing an amendment
to the United States Sentencing Guidelines, which specifically addresses the
effect that a motion to suppress should have in determining whether
an additional one-level reduction is warranted during the plea-bargaining
process. Section II of this Comment will give the background of the
3
4

See generally id.
See United States v. Longoria, 958 F.3d 372, 374 (5th Cir. 2020); see also infra Background Section

II.F.2.
5
See Longoria, 958 F.3d at 376 (“for a quarter century we have repeatedly and ‘routinely affirmed
the denial of a one-level reduction under [section] 3E1.1(b) when the government had to prepare for
a suppression hearing.’”); see also United States v. Rogers, 129 F.3d 76, 80–81 (2d Cir. 1997) (per curiam)
(“In this case, the only defensive measure available to Rogers was to argue that the evidence seized from
her pocket was inadmissible. Thus, in terms of preparation by the government and the investment of
judicial time, the suppression hearing was the main proceeding in this case. . . . Rogers’ offer to enter a
conditional guilty plea and her bench trial on stipulated facts, coming after the suppression hearing, did
not come sufficiently early in the proceedings to allow the court or the government to avoid the burdens of
litigating the case.”).
6
See United States v. Price, 409 F.3d 436, 443–44 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“The District Court’s conclusion
[that the motion to suppress warranted withholding the reduction] cannot be reconciled with the plain
language of § 3E1.1(b)(2), which states that a defendant is eligible for a third-level reduction if he timely
notifies ‘authorities of his intention to enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the government to avoid
preparing for trial.’”); see also Untied States v. Marquez, 337 F.3d 1203, 1211 (10th Cir. 2003)
(citing United States v. Marroquin, 136 F.3d 220, 225 (1st Cir. 1998) (“A defendant, of course, is entitled
to bring a motion to suppress to protect his or her constitutional rights, and we agree that ‘[t]he Guidelines
do not force a defendant to forgo the filing of routine pre-trial motions at the price of receiving a one-step
decrease [under § 3E1.1(b)(2)].’”) (alteration in original)); United States v. Kimple, 27 F.3d 1409, 1414–
15 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that “the district court may properly deny the reduction because [the defendant]
failed to notify authorities of his intent to plead guilty before the Government was able to avoid trial
preparations, or before the court had set the calendar for trial, it cannot deny the reduction on the basis that
[the defendant] exercised his constitutional rights at the pretrial stage of the proceedings” and that
“[m]erely opposing a suppression motion is not sufficient to constitute trial preparation.”).
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plea-bargaining system in federal courts, the inception of the United States
Sentencing Guidelines, as well as an examination of the current language in
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. Section III of this Comment will analyze the statutory
language of U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 by providing insight as to how the various
federal circuits have interpreted that language. Next, Section IV looks
to resolve this schism by proposing an amendment to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b),
which would establish a clear policy regarding when the one-level reduction
would be appropriate in these situations. Lastly, Section V will summarize
this Comment by reiterating the need for this amendment and suggesting
when this amendment should be considered by the United States Sentencing
Commission.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Inception of the United States Sentencing Guidelines
Before the inception of the United States Sentencing Guidelines,
federal judges had the ability to impose sentences in criminal cases with
“virtually unlimited discretion . . . .”7 This unlimited discretion led to
an “unjustifiably wide range of sentences” for offenders convicted under
similar circumstances.8 In response to the disparities in sentencing, Congress
enacted the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (“SRA”).9 Within the SRA,
Congress established the United States Sentencing Commission, a bipartisan
agency, whose goal was to promulgate a set of Guidelines that would
streamline the sentencing process in the federal court system.10 Furthermore,
these Guidelines would also address the disparities in federal sentencing.11
The first version of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines went into effect
on November 1, 1987.12 This version of the Guidelines contained a
sentencing table to calculate the mandatory sentencing range for judges to
apply when sentencing crimes in the federal court.13
B. The Effect of U.S. v. Booker on the Sentencing Guidelines
A major shift occurred after the decision of United States v. Booker,
which examined whether the mandatory application of the Sentencing
Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.14
Answering in the affirmative, the Supreme Court stated that the then-existing
Guidelines system allowed judges to find facts by a preponderance of the
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 2, at 1.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 4.
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226 (2005).
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evidence rather than by the jury making findings of fact beyond a reasonable
doubt.15 Because of the varying burdens of proof, the Supreme Court
remedied this defect in the Guidelines by striking the mandatory provision of
the SRA.16 As such, the SRA, as amended, “[made] the Guidelines effectively
advisory.”17 The Guidelines would then “[require] a sentencing court to
consider Guidelines ranges . . . but [would permit] the court to tailor the
sentence in light of other statutory concerns as well.”18
C. How Federal Courts Use the Guidelines to Calculate the
Defendant’s Sentence
After the Booker decision, courts were directed to employ a
three-step process in calculating the proper Guidelines range for criminal
sentences.19 First, the court must calculate the initial range under the
Sentencing Guidelines.20 This is largely based on the crime that has been
alleged in the case.21 For instance, if a defendant were charged with “Criminal
Sexual Abuse of a Minor Under the Age of Sixteen Years (Statutory Rape) or
Attempt to Commit Such Acts,” their base offense level would be eighteen.22
The base offense level could then be increased based upon other conduct
occurring in conjunction with the alleged offense.23
After taking all adjustments into account, the court must then
calculate the criminal history of the defendant.24 This calculation involves
looking at the past convictions of the defendant to determine the
“Criminal History Category” that should be used to calculate the sentence in
the current case.25 Moreover, the Sentencing Commission has identified four
purposes for including the defendant’s prior convictions in the advisory
Sentencing Guidelines range:
[1] A defendant with a record of prior criminal behavior
is more culpable than a first offender and thus deserving of
greater punishment. [2] General deterrence of criminal
conduct dictates that a clear message be sent to society that
repeated criminal behavior will aggravate the need for
punishment with each recurrence. [3] To protect the public
from further crimes of the particular defendant, the likelihood
See id. at 245; see also U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 2, at 4.
See Booker, 543 U.S. at 245.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 2, at 11.
20
See id.
21
See generally U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
22
See id. § 2A3.2.
23
See, e.g., id. (“If the minor was in the custody, care, or supervisory control of the defendant,
increase by four levels.”); see also generally id. § 3.
24
See generally id. § 4A1.2.
25
See id. § 4A.
15
16
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of recidivism and future criminal behavior must be
considered. [4] Repeated criminal behavior is an indicator of
a limited likelihood of successful rehabilitation.26
After establishing the criminal history of the defendant, the base offense level
and the criminal history category are used to tabulate the advisory sentencing
range on the Sentencing Guidelines Sentencing Table.27 So, continuing to use
the statutory rape charge as an example, if a defendant had a base offense
level of eighteen and a criminal history category of four, his advisory sentence
would be forty-one to fifty-one months.28
Second, the court must consider any policy statements or commentary
in the Sentencing Guidelines Manual regarding departures and variances from
the sentence.29 For instance, the advisory notes under the statutory rape
section of the Guidelines state that “an upward departure may be warranted if
the defendant committed the criminal sexual act in furtherance of
a commercial scheme such as pandering, transporting of persons for the
purpose of prostitution, or the production of pornography.”30 Departures and
variances vary based upon the crime alleged in each case.31
Lastly, the courts were directed to consider all seven factors outlined
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to determine whether the sentence would be sufficient,
but not greater than necessary, in light of the conviction.32 This provision
allows the court to have discretion in sentencing a defendant by allowing the
judge to consider the totality of the circumstances in the case, thereby
tailoring the sentence to each individual defendant.33 The seven factors in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) are:
(1) [T]he nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant;
(2) [T]he need for the sentence imposed to reflect the four
primary purposes of sentencing, i.e., retribution,
26

Id.
See generally id. § 5A.
See id.
29
See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 2, at 11.
30
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A3.3 n.6 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
31
Compare U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A3.2 cmt. n.6 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018)
(allowing an upward variance for sentences stemming from charges statutory rape if the defendant intended
to pander the children or transport them for purposes of producing child pornography), with id. § 2A1.2
cmt. n.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018) (allowing an upward variance for sentences stemming from charges
of second degree murder if the “defendant’s conduct was exceptionally heinous, cruel, brutal, or degrading
to the victim . . . .”).
32
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 2, at 11; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (stating that sentences
should be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” in relation to the charge of conviction);
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 n.6 (2007) (“The fact that § 3553(a) explicitly directs sentencing
courts to consider the Guidelines supports the premise that district courts must begin their analysis with
the Guidelines and remain cognizant of them throughout the sentencing process.”).
33
See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
27
28
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deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation;
(3) [T]he kinds of sentences available (e.g., whether probation
is prohibited or a mandatory minimum term of
imprisonment is required by statute);
(4) [T]he sentencing range established through application of
the sentencing Guidelines and the types of sentences
available under the Guidelines;
(5) [A]ny relevant ‘policy statements’ promulgated by the
Commission;
(6) [T]he need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities
among defendants with similar records who have been
found guilty of similar conduct; and
(7) [T]he need to provide restitution to any victims of the
offense.34
These factors, outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), were considered by the
Commission during their construction of the Guidelines and, as such, have
substantial overlap with the codified Sentencing Guidelines.35
D. Guidelines Calculations Can Occur During the Plea-Bargaining
Phase
Although many of these factors are discussed at a sentencing hearing,
the calculation of the sentencing range can occur during the plea-bargaining
phase.36 For instance, a plea agreement made under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(B) states that the Government will either
recommend or, in the alternative, not oppose a recommendation by the
defendant regarding a sentencing range that would be sufficient in that case.37
If a plea agreement is made under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11(c)(1)(C), the Government will concur with the defendant on an
applicable sentencing range and that range will be binding on the court during
the imposition of the sentence.38 Similarly, these calculations are also
discussed by the probation office in their presentence report, which gives

U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 2, at 3 (footnotes omitted); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 2, at 3 (“[T]wo of the seven factors in section 3553(a) are
the guidelines and the policy statements promulgated by the Commission, and the remaining five reflect
factors that the Commission itself considers in promulgating the guidelines and policy statements.”)
(footnote omitted).
36
See id. at 5–6.
37
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(B) (“[A]n attorney for the government will: . . . recommend, or agree not
to oppose the defendant’s request, that a particular sentence or sentencing range is appropriate . . . .”).
38
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C) (“[A]n attorney for the government will: . . . agree that a specific
sentence or sentencing range is the appropriate disposition of the case . . . [and] (such a recommendation
or request binds the court once the court accepts the plea agreement).”).
34
35
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a vast background into the defendant, the offense, and factors that should be
considered with the sentence that they have recommended to the court.39
E. The Downward Departure Provision of United States Sentencing
Guidelines § 3E1.1
The ability to construct a plea-bargain within federal courts is found
in U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1.40 That provision allows for a “downward departure” on
the initial base level for the offense that has been calculated under the
Guidelines.41
This departure, which is awarded for “acceptance
of responsibility” by the defendant, has evolved since the inception of the
Guidelines in 1987.42 Although the statutory language has evolved, the
reasoning behind the departure has not. This departure is designed
to incentivize defendants for accepting plea bargains and foregoing the
criminal trial that would ensue.43
1. The History of the Downward Departure Provision of § 3E1.1
Prior to 1992, the United States Sentencing Guidelines only provided
the opportunity for a two-level reduction for “acceptance of responsibility.”44
Several factors were attributed to the reduction under § 3E1.1.45 For instance,
judges are more likely to look favorably on a defendant who pleads guilty.46
This belief is largely correlated to the idea that a plea of guilty is indicative of
a lower rate of recidivism once the sentence has been fulfilled.47 Lastly, the
reduction in sentence may also be attributed to “the prosecutor’s willingness
to accept a lower sentence in order to save prosecutorial and judicial
resources. . . .”48 Moreover, this reduction could also be applied in cases

U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 2, at 6.
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
41
See id.
42
Compare U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(b)(1) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 1992), with id.
§ 3E1.1(b) (citing the differences between differing adaptations of the “downward departure” language in
the Guidelines); see supra note 12 and accompanying text.
43
See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(b) cmt. n.2 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018) (“This
adjustment is not intended to apply to a defendant who puts the government to its burden of proof at trial
by denying the essential factual elements of guilt, is convicted, and only then admits guilt and expresses
remorse.”); see also id. § 3E1.1(b) cmt. n.3 (“Entry of a plea of guilty prior to the commencement of trial
combined with truthfully admitting the conduct comprising the offense of conviction, and truthfully
admitting or not falsely denying any additional relevant conduct for which he is accountable . . . will
constitute significant evidence of acceptance of responsibility for the purposes of subsection (a).”).
44
See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 1991); see also United
States v. Vargas, 961 F.3d 566, 573 (2d Cir. 2020).
45
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND
POLICY STATEMENTS 50 (1987).
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 50–51.
39
40
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where a guilty plea had not been entered, but the reduction was warranted
under the facts.49
In 1992, the United States Sentencing Guidelines were amended to
add subsection (b) to the statutory language of § 3E1.1.50 This additional
one-level reduction was provided when “the defendant . . . made a stronger
showing of contrition, and provided greater benefit to the government, than
was demonstrated simply by pleading guilty.”51 Another apparent purpose of
this new provision was to
provide an incentive to defendants to offer to plead guilty at
an early enough stage of the process to save the government
the expense and burden not only of a trial, but also of the
intensive preparation required for a scheduled trial, and to
permit the court to efficiently reallocate the time that had
been set aside for the trial.52
Under this new provision, several requirements had to be met to
warrant the additional reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b).53 First, the
defendant must qualify for the initial two-level reduction under subsection (a)
of the statute.54 Second, the base offense level must have been calculated at
or above level sixteen under the Guidelines.55 Lastly, the defendant must
“[have] assisted authorities in the investigation or prosecution of his own
misconduct . . . .”56
There were two ways for a defendant to assist authorities in their
investigation: either by “timely providing complete information to the
government concerning his own involvement in the offense” or by “timely
notifying authorities of his intention to enter a plea of guilty,
thereby permitting the government to avoid preparing for trial and permitting
the court to allocate its resources efficiently . . . .”57 Under this version
of the Guidelines provision, the power to grant the reduction
under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b) “was vested solely in the judiciary.”58
Moreover, a motion by the United States Attorney at trial was not required
for the one-level reduction to be awarded to the defendant.59

49
Id. at 50 n.83; see also ROGER W. HAINES, JR. ET AL., FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
HANDBOOK app. C amend. 459 (1993).
50
HAINES, supra note 49, at app. C amend. 459.
51
United States v. Vargas, 961 F.3d 566, 573 (2d Cir. 2020).
52
Id.
53
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(b) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 1992).
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
United States v. Sloley, 464 F.3d 355, 359–60 (2d Cir. 2006).
59
United States v. Vargas, 961 F.3d 566, 574 (2d Cir. 2020).
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2. The Current Language of United States Sentencing Guidelines
§ 3E1.1
The next major shift to the plea-bargaining provision of United States
Sentencing Guidelines § 3E1.1 occurred upon the passage of the Prosecutorial
Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003
(“PROTECT Act”).60 Under this amendment, the award of the one-level
reduction under subsection (b) was contingent, in part, on a motion from the
United States Attorney who was pursuing the case.61 The motion of the
United States Attorney indicates to the court that “the defendant has assisted
authorities in the investigation or prosecution of his own misconduct by
timely notifying authorities of his intention to enter a plea of guilty . . . .”62
This shift in authoritative discretion for the one-level reduction back to the
United States Attorney was made “[b]ecause the Government is in the best
position to determine whether the defendant has assisted authorities in
a manner that avoids preparing for trial . . . .”63 Although this discretion
is given to the United States Attorney, they cannot withhold their motion on
“interests not identified in § 3E1.1, such as whether the defendant agrees to
waive his or her right to appeal.”64
Furthermore, the assistance of the defendant should “[permit] the
government to avoid preparing for trial and permitting the government and
the court to allocate their resources efficiently….”65 As such, the timeliness
of the defendant’s plea must be considered under this subsection.66
Moreover, the consideration of this plea is context-specific and thus, requires
analysis on a case-by-case basis.67 As part of their commentary on this
section, the United States Sentencing Commission states that:
[T]he conduct qualifying for a decrease in offense level under
subsection (b) will occur particularly early in the case. [T]he
defendant must have notified authorities of his intention
to enter a plea of guilty at a sufficiently early point in the
process so that the government may avoid preparing for trial
and the court may schedule its calendar efficiently.68

60
See generally Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today
Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108–21, Title IV, § 401(g)(1), 117 Stat. 650, 671.
61
Id. § 401(g)(2)(B).
62
U.S. SENT’G MANUAL § 3E1.1(b) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
63
See U.S. SENT’G MANUAL § 3E1.1 cmt. n.6 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018), amended by
§ 401(g)(2)(B), 117 Stat. at 672; see also United States v. Vargas, 961 F.3d 566, 583 (2d Cir. 2020)
(“Although the district court is not bound by the government’s motion, it must grant substantial deference
to the government’s claim that the timing of the plea allowed it to avoid trial preparation . . . .”).
64
U.S. SENT’G MANUAL § 3E1.1 cmt. n.6 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018); see also infra notes 143–63
and accompanying text.
65
U.S. SENT’G MANUAL § 3E1.1(b) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
66
Id. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.6.
67
Id.
68
Id.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol47/iss2/4

2022]

Plea-Bargaining & Federal Sentencing Guidelines

239

Although the government is given some deference to determine
whether the defendant is entitled to the one-level departure under subsection
(b), the court is also awarded some deference under subsection (b) to override
the motion by the United States Attorney.69
Although this statutory language seems straightforward, the issues
raised under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b) become convoluted when applied in real
cases. This creates a myriad of questions, such as whether a plea is considered
“timely” when the defendant pleads guilty after filing a motion to suppress
evidence.70 This specific issue strikes to the heart of the incongruity between
the circuit courts regarding the interpretation of U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b), the goal
of the Guidelines, and the need for clearer construction regarding the statutory
language of the plea-bargaining provision.
F. The Need for Clarity and Consistency in the Plea-Bargaining
Provision of the United States Sentencing Guidelines
Although many people will never be directly impacted by the
plea-bargaining procedures found in the United States Sentencing Guidelines,
they play a large part in the criminal adjudication process in the federal court
system. In 2020, the Sentencing Guidelines Commission released their
annual report of sentences handed down in federal criminal cases.71
This report encapsulated the data on 76,538 reported federal sentencings for
crimes that were considered felonies or Class A misdemeanors.72
These statistics shine a light on the expansive impact of the plea-bargaining
system and the need for reform in this area.
1. The Statistical Impact of Sentencing in Federal Courts
The Commission’s 2019 report establishes that the majority
of sentences across the federal court system often involve defendants from
minority backgrounds.73 In 2019, approximately 56.3% of all offenders
in federal court were Hispanic, while 20.2% of all offenders were Black.74
Furthermore, non-U.S. citizens accounted for approximately 44% of all
offenders that were sentenced in federal courts in 2019.75
Immigration cases made up the majority of criminal cases in federal
court during the 2019 fiscal year, encompassing approximately 38% of all
69
See id.at n.5 (“The sentencing judge is in a unique position to evaluate a defendant’s acceptance of
responsibility. For this reason, the determination of the sentencing judge is entitled to great deference on
review.”).
70
See e.g., United States v. Longoria, 958 F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 2020).
71
See generally CHARLES R. BREYER ET AL, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2019 ANNUAL. REPORT. AND
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL. SENTENCING STATISTICS, at 8 (2020).
72
See id.
73
See id.
74
See id.
75
See id.
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cases.76 Three other major groups of cases within the federal courts in 2019
included offenses involving narcotics, firearms, and fraud.77 Together, these
four offense categories accounted for approximately 85% of all federal
criminal cases in America during the 2019 fiscal year.78
In 2019, approximately 75% of all reported sentences meted from the
bench were within the applicable Guidelines range or were subject to a lower
sentence based on an applicable reason for departure.79 Moreover, the
majority of federal sentences were adjusted based upon the plea-bargaining
procedures in § 3E1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines; approximately 40,000
defendants were awarded a three-level reduction to their sentences, while
another 28,000 were awarded a two-level reduction under the same section of
the Guidelines.80 Based on these statistics, only 3.7% of all federal sentences
reported in 2019 were not affected by some kind of departure under
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1.81
The statistics found in the Commission’s 2019 report become even
more staggering when examined by specific crime. In 2019, approximately
96% of all drug-trafficking charges adjudicated included a departure based on
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.182 Moreover, 96% of all child pornography cases
adjudicated included a departure based upon the Guidelines.83
These percentages are similar for sentences involving firearms, drug
possession, extortion and racketeering, and crimes regarding national
defense.84 The statistics reach a staggering height of 99.2% when analyzing
the sentences of cases involving issues of immigration.85
2. The Importance of Consistency in the Plea-Bargaining Procedures
in Federal Courts
Although these statistics shed light on the impact that the
United States Sentencing Guidelines have across the entire federal justice
system, the need for consistency is best highlighted when examining how the
process can affect individual defendants. A standout case would be the
Fifth Circuit case of United States v. Longoria.86 During Longoria’s initial
trial, the Probation Office prepared a presentence report (“PSR”), which was
76

See id.
See id.
78
See id.
79
See id.
80
Id. at 73.
81
Id.
82
See id. at 74 (stating that, of the 19,449 drug trafficking sentences reported to the Commission,
18,696 involved an adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1).
83
See id. (stating that, of the 1,353 child pornography cases, 1,299 of those cases involved an
adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1).
84
See id.
85
See id. (stating that, off the 26,472 immigrations cases reported to the Commission, 26,255 of those
cases involved a departure under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1).
86
See generally 958 F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 2020).
77
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used by the court to determine the proper sentence length for the defendant.87
The initial PSR tabulated Longoria’s base offense level at thirty and his initial
criminal history score to be four points, which placed him in
“Criminal History Category III” for sentencing purposes.88 The PSR, after
calculating Longoria’s Sentencing Guidelines range and examining whether
the statute included a limit on the maximum sentence that could be imposed,
determined that Longoria’s advisory range was 120 months, i.e., ten years in
federal prison.89 Longoria filed several objections to the PSR, including the
withholding of a three-level reduction for timely acceptance under
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1.90
During his sentencing by the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas, Longoria’s base offense level was reduced by four
points after the judge sustained an objection for a proposed enhancement for
using a firearm in connection with a separate felony offense.91 Moreover,
Longoria’s sentence was reduced by another two points in conjunction with
his notice of an intent to plead guilty under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a).92 He was
not awarded the additional one-point reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b)
since the prosecutor in that case refused to make the necessary motion, stating
that “she did not file [the] motion because Longoria forced the government
to prepare for ‘a full-blown suppression hearing.’”93 After these adjustments
were made, the district court calculated Longoria’s advisory Sentencing
Guidelines range at sixty-three to seventy-eight months.94 Ultimately,
Longoria was sentenced to the maximum sentence of seventy-eight months in
prison for his initial crime.95
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, Longoria contested the government’s
withholding of the one-point reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b), stating that
the government could not use their preparation for the suppression hearing as
“trial preparation” under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b).96 Under the purview of
stare decisis, the Fifth Circuit sided with the prosecution, holding that
preparation for a suppression hearing can constitute a withholding of the onelevel reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b).97

87
See Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 8, United States v. Longoria, 958 F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 2020)
(No. 19-20201), 2019 WL 3222195.
88
See id. at 8–10.
89
See id. at 10.
90
See id.
91
See Longoria, 958 F.3d at 374 (citing U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) (U.S.
SENT’G COMM’N 2018)).
92
See id.
93
Id.
94
See id. at 375.
95
See id.
96
See id. at 376.
97
See id. (“Even if a minority view, our precedent of course poses a problem for Longoria.
One published decision is all it takes for stare decisis.”).
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Conversely, if Longoria had been in another federal circuit that has
previously held that suppression hearings cannot be used to withhold
a one-level reduction, his sentence may have been much lower. As stated
previously, Longoria’s base offense level, after all adjustments, was
determined to be twenty-four.98 When calculated with a criminal history
category of three, we come to the original Guidelines range discussed in
Longoria of sixty-three to seventy-eight months.99 However, if the additional
one-level reduction had been awarded to Longoria, his advisory Guidelines
range would have been fifty-seven to seventy-one months.100 Therefore,
if Longoria had been sentenced in a different federal circuit, there is
a possibility that his sentence could have been reduced by up to twenty-one
months.101
III. ANALYSIS
Currently, there are two distinct schools of thought on this issue.
One group of courts, spearheaded by the Fifth Circuit, currently holds that the
government may withhold the one-level reduction under § 3E1.1(b) if the
defendant seeks a motion to suppress and requires the prosecution to prepare
for trial regarding the motion.102 In contrast, the Ninth, Tenth, and
D.C. Circuits all hold that motions to suppress, and the preparation thereof by
the prosecution, are not enough by themselves to warrant withholding the
one-level reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b).103 Although the variance in
the courts’ interpretation of U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b) may seem insignificant, this
split manifests itself in lengthier advisory sentencing ranges for similarly
situated defendants in the Second and Fifth Circuits than their counterparts in
the Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits.104 Before this split can be resolved
through an amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines Manual, it is imperative
to examine how the courts have interpreted the phrases in the statutory
language of § 3E1.1.
98
See generally Brief for Defendant-Appellant, at 17–18, United States v. Longoria, 958 F.3d 372
(5th Cir. 2020) (No. 19-20201), 2019 WL 3222195; see also United States v. Longoria, 958 F.3d 372
(5th Cir. 2020) (showing the original base offense level of 30 was reduced by six points: four for the
sustained objection on the enhancement for use in a prior felony and another two points for notice of an
intent to plead guilty under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a)).
99
See supra notes 87–89 and accompanying text.
100
See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5(A) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
101
See id. This potential is calculated by evaluating the difference between the sentence that Longoria
received in his trial (seventy-eight months) and the lowest potential sentence that could have been received
in another Circuit (fifty-seven months). See id. By subtracting these figures, a twenty-one month reduction
in potential sentence would have been possible. See id.; see also Longoria v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 978,
979 (2021) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“The effect of a one-level reduction can be substantial. For the
most serious offenses, the reduction can shift the Guidelines range by years, and even make the difference
between a fixed-term and a life sentence. The present disagreement among the Courts of Appeals means
that similarly situated defendants may receive substantially different sentences depending on the
jurisdiction in which they are sentenced.”).
102
See cases cited supra note 5.
103
See cases cited supra note 6.
104
See supra notes 70–81 and accompanying text.
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A. The Necessity of the Government’s Motion for a Downward
Departure Under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b)
Under the plain language of the Sentencing Guidelines, § 3E1.1(b)
states, in part, that “upon motion of the government stating that the defendant
has assisted authorities in the investigation or prosecution of his own . . . plea
of guilty . . . .”105 This language was added to § 3E1.1 of the Sentencing
Guidelines Manual as part of the PROTECT Act of 2003.106 This provision
shifted some of the deference from the judiciary to the government “[b]ecause
the Government is in the best position to determine whether the defendant has
assisted authorities in a manner that avoids preparing for trial. . . . ”107
This language has recently been challenged as to whether the motion
of the government is not only necessary for the downward departure but
should also be sufficient to fulfill the final condition of subsection (b).108
Most recently, this clause was analyzed by the Second Circuit in
United States v. Vargas.109 In that case, Marilyn Vargas pled guilty after her
motion to suppress evidence was denied by the district court.110
The prosecutor in that case made a motion for the additional one-level
reduction under § 3E1.1(b).111 Even though the prosecutor made the requisite
motion, the court chose to deny Vargas the additional reduction due to the
suppression hearing.112 Marilyn Vargas appealed the denial of a one-level
reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b).113 In her appeal, Vargas argued that
“once the district court [had] granted a two-level reduction[,]… under
§ 3E1.1(b), the court [had] no power to deny the motion; it [was] required to
reduce the defendant’s offense level by one.”114
The plain language of the statute does not give clear direction to the
sufficiency of the government’s motion for a downward departure in federal
criminal cases.115 Under the previous statutory language, the statute “listed
[the criteria] sequentially within a conditional clause introduced by the word
‘if,’ and ultimately joined by the conjunction ‘and.’”116 This construction
made it apparent to those involved that all three conditions must be present
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(b) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
See generally Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today
Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108–21, Title IV, § 401(g)(1), 117 Stat. 650, 671.
107
See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 cmt. n.6, amended by § 401(g)(2)(B),
117 Stat. at 672.
108
See generally United States v. Vargas, 961 F.3d 566 (2d. Cir. 2020).
109
See generally id.
110
See id. at 570.
111
See id.
112
See id. (“The court denied the government’s motion for the additional onelevel (sic) reduction under
§ 3E1.1(b) because Vargas pled guilty only ‘after a lengthy suppression hearing had been held that required
a substantial amount of work on the government’s part’. . . .”).
113
See id. at 571.
114
Id.
115
See id. at 574.
116
Id. at 574–75.
105
106
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before the court could award the one-level reduction under that section of the
Sentencing Guidelines.117 The amended language does not conform to the
same grammatical build.118 Under the amended language, the third item in
the list is a prepositional phrase. This “inelegant construction” of the statutory
language was considered “the root of the ambiguity in the text.”119
The court reasoned that, based upon this construction, it was
undisputed that Congress, from a procedural standpoint, made the motion
from the government a requirement for eligibility for the one-level downward
departure of U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b).120 This construction, however, also
established that the government’s motion “was plainly inserted to limit or
condition the availability of the reduction.”121 The United States Sentencing
Guidelines commentary reinforces this concept, stressing that the reduction
“may only be granted upon a formal motion by the Government . . . .”122
Moreover, this provision should also be analyzed in comparison to
other sections of statutory language regarding similar provisions.
For instance, 18 U.S.C. § 3553 codified several factors that should be
considered by a federal judge before imposing a sentence at the conclusion of
the criminal litigation process.123 Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) states that
“[u]pon motion of the Government, the court shall have the authority to
impose a sentence below a level established by statute as a minimum sentence
so as to reflect a defendant’s substantial assistance in the investigation or
prosecution of another person who has committed an offense.”124
This statutory language has been interpreted by several courts to establish that
a motion by the government is a prerequisite for imposition of a sentence
below the statutory minimum, but this motion does not force any obligation
on the court to award a sentence below the statutory minimum.125
The court in Vargas also examined the provision of
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b) against another provision of the Sentencing
Guidelines—that of U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1.126 United States Sentencing
Guidelines § 5K1.1 explains when the court may depart from the Sentencing
Guidelines after a defendant has provided substantial assistance to
117

See id. at 575; see also U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(b) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N

1992).
118

Vargas, 961 F.3d at 575.
Id.
Id.
121
Id. at 576.
122
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 cmt. n.6, amended by § 401(g)(2)(B), 117 Stat. at 672.
123
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
124
Id. § 3553(e).
125
See e.g., Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120, 125–26 (1996) (“We believe that § 3553(e)
requires a Government motion requesting or authorizing the district court to ‘impose a sentence below
a level established by statute as minimum sentence’ before the court may impose such a sentence.”);
see also United States v. Huerta, 878 F.2d 89, 94 n.2 (2nd Cir. 1989) (“As in the case of plea bargains,
a court is free to grant or deny a Section 3553(e) motion by the government.”).
126
See Vargas, 961 F.3d at 576.
119
120
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authorities.127 The language of U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 states that “[u]pon motion
of the government stating that the defendant has provided substantial
assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has
committed an offense, the court may depart from the guidelines.”128 Like the
motion in 18 U.S.C. 3553(e), “the motion [in U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1] is
a prerequisite to the authorized departure, but the court is permitted, not
required, to grant a reduced sentence.”129
Lastly, it appears that the legislative drafters wanted to allow the court
some discretion as to whether to award the one-level reduction. The final
phrase says that the notification to enter a plea should “permit[] the
government and the court to allocate their resources efficiently. . . .”130
In their conclusion, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that, “[w]hile
the government is in the best position to assess whether the plea came
sufficiently early to allow [reallocation of] resources, the court, and not the
government, is in the best position to determine how the plea affected the
court’s ability to make efficient use of [their] resources.”131 Although this
decision would be binding in the Second Circuit, this decision would not
prevent any other challenges to the sufficiency of the government motion in
other federal circuits.
B. Timely Notification, Trial Preparation, and the Effective Allocation
of Prosecutorial and Judicial Resources
The United States Sentencing Guidelines state that the motion by the
government signifies that the defendant has provided “timely” notification of
an intent to plead guilty to the charged crime or crimes.132 According to the
commentary of the Sentencing Guidelines, the concept of “timeliness” is
context-specific and will vary on a case-by-case basis.133 The Sentencing
Commission provides very little guidance in the interpretation
of “timeliness,” stating that the plea should come “particularly early in the
case” as to allow the government to avoid preparing for trial and to allow the
court to efficiently schedule pending cases.134
1. Establishing “Timely Notification” Takes More than a Quick
Perusal of the Calendar
Since the inception of the United States Sentencing Guidelines in
1984, the federal courts have weighed a variety of factors to determine
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134

Published by eCommons, 2022

See generally U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
Id.
Vargas, 961 F.3d at 576.
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(b) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018) (emphasis added).
Vargas, 961 F.3d at 577–78.
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See id. § 3E1.1. cmt. n.6.
See id.

246

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:2

whether a defendant’s notification should be considered “timely” to qualify
for the one-level reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b).135 One of the factors
courts have considered is the examination of the calendar to determine the
length of time between the date of the notification in relation to the start of
the criminal trial.136 Typically, pleas that are made within forty-eight hours
of the onset of trial are not considered timely to warrant the reduction under
§ 3E1.1(b).137 Although a larger length of time may favor the defendant in
regard to “timely notification,” it will not guarantee the additional one-level
reduction in every situation.138
Another factor that has previously been analyzed by the courts is
whether the information provided by the defendant assisted the police in their
investigation of the crime in question.139 Under previous versions of the
plea-bargaining process outlined in U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, defendants were able
to obtain a one-level reduction to their offense level by “timely providing
complete information to the government concerning his own involvement in
the offense . . . .”140 To qualify for that provision of the Sentencing
Guidelines, the knowledge proffered by the defendant must have been
information that authorities have not discovered at that point in their
investigation.141 The court did not consider whether the information would
have been easily obtainable by the authorities, nor whether the disclosure
spared the government the burden of undertaking any investigatory efforts.142
With such a low threshold, the timeliness element of U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b) was
often easily met.143

135
See generally Ellen M. Bryant, Section E1.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Bargaining with
the Guilty, 44 Cath. U.L. Rev. 1269, 1270, 1273 (1995).
136
See, e.g., United States v. Robinson 14 F.3d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that a plea that was
received four days before the beginning of trial was not considered timely for a reduction under
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b)). But see United States v. Dethlefs, 123 F.3d 39, 43 (1st Cir. 1997) (“[T]he timeliness
requirement of [U.S.S.G. §] 3E1.1(b)(2) cannot always be measured simply by counting calendar pages.”).
137
See e.g., United States v. Nomeland, 7 F.3d 744, 749 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating that a plea that was
proffered on the eve of trial did not warrant the one-level reduction under subsection (b) because the plea
was not timely in nature); United States v. McQuay, 7 F.3d 800, 802 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating that a plea
received one day before the start of a second trial was not considered timely under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1).
138
See, e.g., United States v. Marquez, 337 F.3d 1203, 1212–13 (10th Cir. 2003) (stating that a plea
that was received eight days before the beginning of a trial was considered “timely”
under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1); Dethlefs, 123 F.3d at 41, 43 (stating that a plea received two weeks before
the start of a trial is considered timely for a one-level reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1).
But see United States v. Babar, 512 Fed. Appx. 78, 81 (2d. Cir. 2013) (“[T]he government was well within
its discretion in determining that an additional reduction was not warranted because, given the complexity
of the case, a plea only six weeks before trial [was not timely].”).
139
See e.g., United States v. Schau, 1 F.3d 729, 731 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating that authorities had already
recovered the stolen money and the government had already prepared for trial before defendant confessed
and pleaded guilty, therefore prohibiting the one-level reduction under 3E1.1(b)(2)).
140
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(b) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 1992).
141
See United States v. Hopper, 27 F.3d 378, 384–85 (9th Cir. 1994).
142
See id. at 385.
143
See id. at 384–85 (“If the disclosure is timely enough to spare the Government investigation, then
the defendant has complied with the primary purpose of subsection (b) of promoting prosecutorial
economy.”).
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2. What Exactly Constitutes Trial Preparation in the Federal Court
System?
Under the current language of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines, timeliness is tied to several areas of the litigation process, such as
the prosecutor’s preparation for the upcoming trial as well as the calendar of
the federal court.144 By a plain reading of the statutory language, the
Sentencing Guidelines state that a defendant’s timely notification of an intent
to plead guilty “thereby [permits] the government to avoid preparing for
trial . . . .”145 Although the term “trial preparation,” on its’ face, appears to be
unambiguous, several circuits have examined what should be considered
“trial preparation” under the Sentencing Guidelines.
a. A Refusal to Sign a Waiver of Appeal Does Not Implicate the
Trial Preparation Clause under § 3E1.1(b)
One of the earliest challenges to the “trial preparation” provision of
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b) centered upon whether a defendant’s refusal to waive
their rights to an appeal in a given case was sufficient to withhold the onelevel reduction on the grounds of “trial preparation.”146 Of these cases,
United States v. Divens is often cited as the case which establishes the
foundation for examining whether a refusal to sign a waiver of appeal is
enough to withhold the one-level reduction under 3E1.1(b).147 In Divens, the
defendant was charged with one count of possession with intent to
distribute.148 As part of the plea agreement offered by the government,
Divens was required to waive any appeal that was not based upon either an
excessively high sentence under the Guidelines or ineffective assistance of
counsel.149 Divens refused to sign the agreement but still filed a motion with
the district court, signifying his intent to plead guilty to the aforementioned
charge.150 Furthermore, Divens signed an “acceptance of responsibility
statement,” admitting his guilt for the possession charge.151
See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(b) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
Id.
146
Compare United States v. Johnson, 581 F.3d 994, 1002 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that “allocation
and expenditure of prosecutorial resources for the purposes of defending an appeal is a rational basis” for
the government to withhold a § 3E1.1(b) motion), and United States v. Deberry, 576 F.3d 708, 711
(7th Cir. 2009) (holding that a requirement that the defendant would waive their right to appeal would avoid
“expense and uncertainty”), and United States v. Newson, 515 F.3d 374, 377 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that
the prosecutor’s interests under 3E1.1 include the government’s time and effort during both prejudgment
and postjudgment proceedings), with United States v. Divens, 650 F.3d 343, 348 (4th Cir. 2011)
(stating that “the text of § 3E1.1(b) reveals a concern for the efficient allocation of trial resources, not
appellate resources.”) (emphasis in original), and United States v. Davis, 714 F.3d 474, 476 (7th Cir. 2013)
(“[I]nsisting that he waive his right to appeal before he may receive the maximum credit under the
Guidelines for accepting responsibility serves none of the interests identified in section 3E1.1.”).
147
See 18 U.S.C. app § 775.
148
Divens, 650 F.3d at 344.
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
Id.
144
145
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At sentencing, the government refused to make the motion for the
one-level reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b), citing Divens’s refusal
to waive his right to collateral attack.152 Although Divens objected to the
government’s refusal to make the motion for a downward departure, the
district court agreed with the government, stating that “the decision as
to whether to move for an additional one-level reduction lay ‘completely in
the discretion of the Government.’”153 After receiving his sentence, Divens
made a timely appeal to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals regarding the
government’s refusal to make the motion under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b).154
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the central contention was whether
“Divens’s failure to sign the appellate waiver justifies the Government’s
refusal to move for the additional one-level reduction under § 3E1.1(b).”155
As part of their analysis, the court first examined another provision of the
Sentencing Guidelines, § 5K1.1, which outlines whether a downward
departure should be given to a criminal defendant for offering “substantial
assistance” to the government.156 Under that provision, the government is
able to withhold a motion for a downward departure so long as
“[the government] provides any legitimate reason, even one unrelated to the
defendant’s ‘substantial assistance.’”157
Although the Government is allowed substantial deference to
withhold the downward departure motion under § 5K1.1, the Fourth Circuit
held that the government did not possess the same level of deference under
§ 3E1.1(b).158 As such, under § 3E1.1(b), “the Government retains discretion
to refuse to move for an additional one-level reduction, but only on the basis
of an interest recognized by the guideline itself—not, as with § 5K1.1, on the
basis of any conceivable legitimate interest.”159
Moreover, the Fourth Circuit stated that the defendant’s refusal to
sign an appellate waiver did not support the government’s withholding of the
motion for a one-level reduction under § 3E1.1(b).160 Instead, the court
focused upon the plain language of the Guidelines, stating that:
[A]lthough § 3E1.1(b) subsequently identifies general
interests—resource allocation and trial avoidance—the
152

Id.
Id.
See id.
155
Id. at 345.
156
See id.; see also U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018)
(“Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the
investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense, the court may depart from
the guidelines.”).
157
Divens, 650 F.3d at 345 (citing United States v. Butler, 272 F.3d 683, 687 (4th Cir. 2001)).
158
See id. at 345–47, 346 n.1.
159
Id. at 347.
160
See id. at 348 (“[Section] 3E1.1(b) simply does not require that a defendant provide the prosecution
with the type of assistance that might reduce the ‘expense and uncertainty’ attendant to an appeal.”).
153
154
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syntax of the guideline dictates that the furtherance of these
interests must again derive from [a] single source: the
defendant’s “timely notif[ication of] authorities of his
intention to enter a plea of guilty.161
As such, § 3E1.1(b) “instructs the Government to determine simply
whether the defendant has ‘timely’ entered a ‘plea of guilty,’”
therefore furthering the underlying purpose of the Guidelines itself.162
Additionally, the Fourth Circuit noted that the Guidelines focus upon
the efficient allocation of trial resources, not appellate resources.163
The commentary on the Guidelines reflects this concept, stating that
“[t]his adjustment is not intended to apply to a defendant who puts the
government to its burden of proof at trial by denying the essential factual
elements of guilt, is convicted, and only then admits guilt and expresses
remorse” and that “[t]he sentencing judge is in a unique position to evaluate
a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility.”164 As such, the Fourth Circuit
held that a defendant’s refusal to waive their right to appeal could not support
the government’s withholding of a one-level reduction under § 3E1.1(b).165
After the decision in Divens, the United States Sentencing Commission made
an amendment to the commentary of § 3E1.1, explicitly stating that the
government cannot use the refusal to sign an appellate waiver to withhold the
one-level reduction under the Guidelines.166
b. Preparation for a Fatico Hearing Does Not Support Withholding
a Reduction under § 3E1.1(b)
In 2011, the Second Circuit examined whether the government could
withhold a one-level reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b) if the
government prosecutor would have to prepare for a Fatico hearing.167
In United States v. Lee, the defendant pled guilty to four counts, all stemming
from narcotics violations.168 As part of the sentencing phase of the litigation,

161

Id.
See id. ([“Section 3E1.1(b)] does not permit the Government to withhold a motion for a one-level
reduction because the defendant has declined to perform some other act to assist the Government.”)
(citing United States v. Richins, 429 F.Supp. 2d 1259, 1263–64 (D. Utah 2006)).
163
See id.
164
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(b) nn.2, 5 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
165
See Divens, 650 F.3d at 350 (“If the Government cannot provide a valid reason for refusing to move
for an additional one-level reduction under [3E1.1(b)] and continues to refuse to move for such a reduction,
the district court should order the Government to file the motion.”).
166
18 U.S.C. app. § 775.
167
See generally United States v. Lee, 653 F.3d 170 (2d. Cir. 2011); see also Alexa Chu Clinton,
Comment, Taming the Hydra: Prosecutorial Discretion under the Acceptance of Responsibility Provision
of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1467, 1481–82, 1481 n.105 (2012) (“A Fatico
hearing is a presentencing hearing at which parties may offer evidence as to appropriate sentencing.”)
(emphasis added).
168
See Lee, 653 F.3d at 172.
162
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the PSR was drafted by the Probation Department.169 The defendant in Lee
disputed several facts included in the PSR, which prompted the Fatico hearing
before sentencing.170 At the conclusion of the Fatico hearing, the court began
the sentencing phase of the trial.171 At sentencing, the prosecutor refused
to move for the one-level reduction under § 3E1.1(b), citing their preparation
for the Fatico hearing.172
On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
government’s refusal to make the motion based upon preparation for a Fatico
hearing was unlawful.173 As part of their reasoning, the Second Circuit stated
that the plain language of U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b) “refers only to the prosecution
resources saved when the defendant’s timely guilty plea ‘permit[s] the
government to avoid preparing for trial.’”174 When analyzed under this
language, the court stated that preparation for a Fatico hearing was not
analogous to that of trial preparation since “Lee’s post-plea objections to the
PSR did not require the government to prepare ‘for trial.’”175 Moreover, the
court also reasoned that a defendant “has a due process right to reasonably
contest errors in the PSR that affect his sentence” and that withholding the
one-level reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b) would be tantamount to
punishing the defendant in that situation.176
c. Motions to Suppress Evidence May Implicate the Trial
Preparation Clause of § 3E1.1(b)
The federal circuits are presently split as to whether preparation for
a motion to suppress and the subsequent suppression hearing that typically
follows, should suffice to withhold the one-level reduction under
§ 3E1.1(b).177 A suppression hearing, also referred to as an exclusionary
hearing, is “a pre-trial hearing in a criminal action to determine whether
evidence is inadmissible because it was discovered or seized in violation of
the Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth Amendments.”178 Since the decision on a motion
to suppress can have a substantial effect on criminal proceedings, it is crucial
to analyze how the various circuits have explored the tenuous relationship

169
See id.; see also U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 2, at 6. (“The PSR contains not only information
about the offense and the offender but also the statutory range of punishment and a calculation of the
relevant sentencing guidelines (with a corresponding guideline sentencing range), [and] any bases that may
exist for imposing a sentence outside of the applicable range.”).
170
See Lee, 653 F.3d at 172.
171
See id.
172
See id.
173
See id. at 173.
174
Id. at 174 (citing U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(b) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018)).
175
Id.
176
Id.
177
See generally United States v. Longoria, 958 F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 2020); United States v. Rogers,
129 F.3d 76 (2d. Cir. 1997).
178
Suppression Hearing, BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY (2012).
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between a motion to suppress and the effect it can have on a potential
downward departure under the Sentencing Guidelines.
1) Preparation for a Motion to Suppress Evidence is Sufficient to
Withhold the Reduction under § 3E1.1(b)
One of the predominant arguments that circuit courts have used to
support withholding the one-level reduction, in conjunction with a motion to
suppress, is centered upon whether the evidence that would be presented at
a suppression hearing would have substantial overlap with the criminal trial
itself.179 For instance, in United States v. Rogers, the defendant-appellant
challenged whether they were entitled to the one-level reduction under
§ 3E1.1(b).180 The Second Circuit affirmed the district court decision,
specifically focusing on the motion to suppress and subsequent hearing to
determine whether the evidence was admissible at trial.181
In their decision, the Second Circuit noted that the motion to suppress
was the only viable option for the defendant before pleading guilty.182
As such, the court determined that “in terms of preparation by the government
and the investment of judicial time, the suppression hearing was the main
proceeding in [the] case.”183 Although the defendant offered to enter
a conditional plea after losing at the suppression hearing, the Second Circuit
determined that this offer “did not come sufficiently early [enough] in the
proceedings to allow the court or the government to avoid the burdens of
litigating the case.”184
Moreover, the doctrine of stare decisis has played a factor in similar
situations.185 For instance, in the Fifth Circuit, case precedent establishes that
a motion to suppress “preclud[es] the government and the sentencing court
from ‘allocat[ing] their resources efficiently,’ a concern central to § 3E1.1.”186
This precedent was recently enforced in the Fifth Circuit, through the doctrine
of stare decisis, in United States v. Longoria.187
In Longoria, the defendant-appellant challenged the withholding of
the government’s motion under § 3E1.1(b) on the basis that the defendant
made a motion to suppress the evidence.188 At the onset of their decision, the
Fifth Circuit noted that Longoria had a “compelling” argument for the
179

See, e.g., Rogers, 129 F.3d at 80–81.
See id. at 80.
181
See id. at 80–81.
182
See id. at 80 (“In this case, the only defensive measure available to [the defendant] was to argue
that the evidence seized from her pocket was inadmissible.”).
183
Id.
184
See id. at 80–81.
185
See, e.g., United States v. Longoria, 958 F.3d 372, 376 (5th Cir. 2020) (“One published decision
is all it takes for stare decisis.”).
186
See, e.g., United States v. Silva, 865 F.3d 238, 245 (5th Cir. 2017).
187
See generally 958 F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 2020).
188
See id. at 376.
180
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one-level reduction based upon the plain language of the Guidelines.189
Even though the Fifth Circuit considered Longoria’s argument compelling,
the case precedent in the Fifth Circuit mandated that the court affirm the
government’s decision to withhold the reduction since they had to prepare for
the suppression hearing.190
2) Preparation for a Motion to Suppress Evidence is Not Sufficient
to Withhold the Reduction under § 3E1.1(b)
Although some circuit courts believe that a motion to suppress is
enough to warrant withholding the reduction under the Guidelines, other
circuit courts believe that a motion to suppress, on its own, is not enough to
warrant withholding the one-level reduction under § 3E1.1(b).191 One of the
arguments used by these courts centers on a plain reading of the Sentencing
Guidelines, which states that the government’s motion should signify that
“the defendant has assisted authorities . . . by timely notifying authorities of
his intention to enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the government to
avoid preparing for trial . . . .”192 Since motions to suppress are generally
settled before the onset of trial, the preparation for those hearings does not
warrant withholding the reduction under § 3E1.1(b).193
Moreover, circuit courts have also determined that withholding the
reduction under § 3E1.1(b) because a defendant filed a motion to suppress
would be tantamount to punishing them for exercising their constitutional
rights.194 In United States v. Kimple, the Ninth Circuit sought to determine
whether the district court erred in withholding the one-level reduction under
the Guidelines.195 During the trial in the district court, “Kimple vigorously
defended himself by filing a motion to suppress evidence that involved
extensive briefing by the parties and hearing and consideration by the

189
See id. (“Section 3E1.1(b) speaks of ‘trial,’ not pretrial hearings, and preparing for a suppression
hearing usually requires less time and resources than trial preparation.”).
190
See id. (“[F]or a quarter century we have repeatedly and ‘routinely affirmed the denial of a onelevel reduction under section 3E1.1(b) when the government had to prepare for a suppression hearing.’”)
(quoting United States v. Silva, 865 F.3d 238, 244 (5th Cir. 2017)).
191
See cases cited supra note 6.
192
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(b) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018) (emphasis added).
193
See, e.g., United States v. Price, 409 F.3d 436, 443–44 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“The District Court’s
conclusion on this point cannot be reconciled with the plain language of § 3E1.1(b)(2) . . . [w]hile the
Government did have to prepare for a suppression hearing, the Government does not dispute that it never
had to prepare for trial. Therefore, under the plain language of U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b)(2), [the defendant]
was entitled to a third-level reduction in his offense level.”); accord, e.g., United States v. Marquez,
337 F.3d 1203, 1212 (10th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e hold that where a defendant has filed a non-frivolous motion
to suppress, and there is no evidence that the government engaged in preparation beyond that which was
required for the motion, a district court may not rely on the fact that the defendant filed a motion to suppress
. . . to justify a denial of the third level reduction under § 3E1.1(b)(2).”).
194
See, e.g., United States v. Kimple, 27 F.3d 1409, 1414 (9th Cir. 1994); accord United States
v. Marroquin, 136 F.3d 220, 225 (1st Cir. 1998) (“The Guidelines do not force a defendant to forgo the
filing of routine pre-trial motions as the price of receiving a one-step decrease.”).
195
See Kimple, 27 F.3d at 1411.
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Court.”196 Before the district court could make an official ruling on the
suppression motion, Kimple pled guilty to one count of the superseding
indictment.197 At sentencing, the district court denied the one-level reduction
to Kimple’s sentencing, citing the motion to suppress as part of their
reasoning.198
On appeal in the Ninth Circuit, the court concluded that the district
court erred in denying the one-level reduction for timely acceptance due to
the motion to suppress.199 In their analysis, the Ninth Circuit noted that “in
determining a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility, a sentencing court
cannot consider against a defendant any constitutionally protected conduct,
whether it occurs before or after the entry of a plea.”200 Additionally, the court
stated that “constitutionally protected conduct,” such as filing a motion to
suppress, should not be held against a criminal defendant when examining
whether that defendant is entitled to a reduction under § 3E1.1(b)(2).201
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit concluded that “a defendant is entitled to receive
the timely acceptance reduction only if he has pled guilty before the
prosecution has begun meaningful trial preparations and before the district
court has unnecessarily expended its resources, thereby preserving
his constitutional rights and fulfilling the goals of subsection (b)(2).”202
Since the government could not establish that they had completed any trial
preparation beyond the suppression hearing, the Ninth Circuit determined that
Kimple was entitled to the one-level reduction, thus vacating and remanding
the decision to the lower court.203
IV. RECTIFYING THE SPLIT: PROPOSING AN AMENDMENT TO THE
SENTENCING GUIDELINES
In an effort to rectify this schism between the Circuits, an amendment
must be made to the United States Sentencing Guidelines that gives direct
guidance as to how courts balance motions to suppress against the language
of the plea-bargaining provision in U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b). Rather than making
an amendment to the direct language of the Guidelines, this proposal seeks to
add commentary into the advisory notes that follow the statutory language.
This method is similar to what was done after United States v. Divens, which
196

Id. at 1414.
See id.
See id. (“I would have to say that here there was some delay in making the decision to plead guilty.
There were two motions. They were voluminous. They required considerable effort on the part of the
Government and on the part of the Court. I think in this context, the additional point off is not justifiable,
so I don’t accept the objection [challenging the withholding of the one-level reduction under
3E1.1(b)(2)].”).
199
See id. at 1413 (“The denial of a reduction under subsection (b)(2) is impermissible if it penalizes
a defendant who has exercised his constitutional rights.”).
200
Id. (citing United States v. Watt, 910 F.2d 587, 592 (9th Cir. 1990)).
201
See id.
202
Id.
203
See id. at 1415.
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addressed the refusal to sign an appellate waiver.204 This method would allow
for the United States Sentencing Commission to address the dispute over the
motion to suppress but would not affect the federal court’s analysis on any
other pre-trial motions. The following commentary, which would be added
within the advisory notes of the Sentencing Guidelines, would state:
Motions to suppress are presumptively considered pre-trial
motions and, for the purposes of § 3E1.1(b), will not
automatically preclude a reduction under the Guidelines.
Should the Government elect to withhold the reduction due
to the defendant’s motion to suppress, the burden is on the
Government to establish, by clear and convincing evidence,
that their preparation for the motion to suppress would have
“substantial overlap” with the impending criminal trial. The
court must then determine whether the Government has met
their burden to withhold the one-level reduction under
§ 3E1.1(b). If the court determines that the Government has
not met their burden, the court must compel the Government
to file the motion for the one-level reduction under
subsection (b).
This commentary does not preclude the court from denying
the one-level motion under subsection (b) if the defendant’s
plea was not timely and, therefore, did not allow for efficient
allocation of the court’s resources.
A. The Procedural Impact
At the onset, this amendment seeks to protect the defendant’s
constitutional right to challenge evidence before going to trial.205 The motion
to suppress evidence is standard practice in criminal litigation and, if they are
sustained, can be a huge boon to the defendant’s ability to avoid jailtime.
By presumptively withholding the one-level reduction under subsection (b)
of the Guidelines, defendants are essentially challenged to “roll the dice”
when filing their motion to suppress. If their motion to suppress is sustained,
then the evidence is excluded. If, however, their motion to suppress is
overruled, then the defendant is penalized with a higher base offense level.
This amendment to the advisory notes eliminates that risk-allocation by
initially protecting the defendant’s interest in filing their motion to suppress
before pleading guilty to any criminal charges. Furthermore, this also
encapsulates the underlying principles of the “rule of lenity,” a rule of
204
See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(b) cmt. n.6 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, amended
2013);
see generally 650 F.3d 343 (4th Cir. 2011).
205
See generally U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”).

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol47/iss2/4

2022]

Plea-Bargaining & Federal Sentencing Guidelines

255

statutory interpretation, which states that ambiguous criminal statutes should
be interpreted in favor of the defendant.206
At the same time, this amendment also allows the government the
opportunity to withhold the one-level reduction, so long as the circumstances
do not warrant the reduction. The Sentencing Commission has acknowledged
that the federal prosecutor has the best vantage point to determine how much
overlap would exist between the hearing for the motion to suppress and the
actual trial. This is evidenced by the statement in the Guidelines that
“the Government is in the best position to determine whether the defendant
has assisted authorities in a manner that avoids preparing for trial.”207
As such, the federal prosecutor must be given the opportunity to support their
withholding of the one-level departure due to “substantial overlap” between
the motion to suppress and the actual trial. Similarly, the higher standard
of “[c]lear and convincing evidence” should streamline the number of
challenges to this provision each year, thus promoting the efficient allocation
of resources by the government and the court.208 By allowing the federal
prosecutor to retain some discretion to withhold the one-level reduction under
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b), this amendment maintains an efficient balance of power
between the prosecutor and the court, as designed by the 2003 amendment in
the PROTECT Act.209
Additionally, this amendment would not preclude the court from
withholding the reduction due to the defendant’s untimely notification, which
would affect the allocation of court resources. In contrast with the
government’s resources in preparation for trial, the court’s resources largely
center on the use of the courtroom and the judicial staff being available for
hearings. This amendment would not strip the court’s ability to evaluate how
the defendant’s notice of an intent to plead guilty would affect the allocation
of judicial resources moving forward. Should the defendant not give any
intent to plead guilty until after the conclusion of the hearing on the motion
to suppress, the court would be within its authority to refuse to accept the
government’s motion for a reduction under the Guidelines if the court was not
able to effectively allocate its staff and its courtroom facilities.
Ultimately, this amendment accomplishes the goal of the pleabargaining provision of the Guidelines, which is the efficient allocation of
206
See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
863 (2012); see also Rowe v. Lockhart, 736 F.2d 457, 461 (8th Cir. 1984) (“The rule of lenity is a rule of
statutory construction that provides that ambiguities in criminal statues must be resolved in favor of
lenity.”); State v. Guarnero, 867 N.W.2d 400, 408 (Wis. 2015) (“The rule of lenity provides that when
doubt exists as to the meaning of a criminal statute, ‘a court should apply the rule of lenity and interpret
the statute in favor of the accused.’”).
207
See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
208
See, e.g., Roche Diagnostics Corp. v. Priority Healthcare Corp., No. 2:18-CV-01479-KOB, 2020
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81449, at *11–12 (N.D. Ala. May 8, 2020) (“Clear and convincing evidence is
a demanding but not insatiable standard, [but] requiring proof that a claim is highly probable.”).
209
See supra notes 60–64 and accompanying text.
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resources. By balancing the constitutional rights of the defendant, the duties
of the federal prosecutor, and the time of the federal courts, this amendment
creates a standard that is workable for all parties. This clear standard will lead
to less time litigating disputes regarding the downward departure provision
and, therefore, will permit both the federal prosecutor and the court to
“efficiently allocate” their resources as stated in the Guidelines.
B. Policy Considerations
As stated previously, this amendment would streamline the process
for examining the effect of a motion to suppress on the plea-bargaining
provision, which, in turn, would allow for the efficient allocation of resources
by the federal court. By giving clarity to the procedural process, courts will
hear fewer cases regarding motions to suppress and their effect on advisory
Sentencing Guidelines ranges. At the same time, this amendment still
empowers judges to deny the motion in the event that judicial resources are
not being allocated efficiently. Moreover, for practitioners within the legal
field, this amendment would reduce the inconsistencies in sentencing between
the circuits, which was the original aim of the Sentencing Guidelines.210
The advisory note would give guidance to practitioners on how the motion to
suppress should affect the plea-bargaining procedures at the federal level.
With this information in hand, defense attorneys can ascertain a firm snapshot
of their client’s base offense level after factoring in all reductions.
Lastly, this amendment creates a fair process, which strengthens
public opinion of the criminal justice system in America. Although people
may not always agree about the outcome of a case, society must believe that
the criminal justice system is fair. By establishing a clear, workable standard
that protects the constitutional rights of the accused, while also allowing the
government to pursue justice, this amendment can hopefully instill societal
confidence in the criminal justice system.
V. CONCLUSION
As the schism currently stands, some defendants are left with a grave
decision during the pre-trial phase of their criminal trial: they must either take
the deal that they are given or “roll the dice” and exercise their constitutional
right by filing a motion to suppress evidence. If this challenge fails,
defendants are likely left with longer advisory sentencing periods and,
possibly, longer sentences in federal prisons. This choice seemingly punishes
defendants for exercising their rights by requiring the federal prosecutor to
‘do their jobs’ and substantiate the evidentiary chain required by the United
States Constitution.

210

See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text.
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This delicate balance between the defendant’s constitutional right to
challenge evidence and the plea-bargaining system in the Sentencing
Guidelines must be addressed by the United States Sentencing Commission.
Although the United States Sentencing Commission has amended the pleabargaining provision of the Guidelines in the past, they have typically elected
to do so after the United States Supreme Court has weighed in on the
contested provision. The Supreme Court may hear this issue in the future, but
currently, they have no plans to do so.211
Rather than wait for the Supreme Court to elect to hear oral arguments
on this issue, the Sentencing Commission should address this issue directly
and amend the Guidelines to avoid any further confusion amongst the federal
circuits.212 By acting immediately, the Sentencing Commission can protect
the rights of defendants while also promoting the efficiency of the prosecutor
and the courts. Although this proposed amendment may not be adopted
immediately, my hope is that consistency in the plea-bargaining provision of
the United States Sentencing Guidelines is within reach . . . and when that day
finally comes, I have to believe that Olivia Benson and I would both have
something to celebrate.

211
212

See United States v. Longoria, 958 F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 2020), cert. denied 141 S. Ct. 978 (Mar. 22, 2021).

See Longoria v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 978, 979 (Mar. 22, 2021) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(“The Sentencing Commission should have the opportunity to address this issue in the first instance . . . .”).
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